WOLDEAMANUEL v. GEORGETOWN UNIV. HOSP., 703 A.2d 1243 (D.C. 1997)

No. 95-CV-962.District of Columbia Court of Appeals.Argued November 19, 1997.
Decided December 30, 1997.

APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, JOHN H. BAYLY, JR., J.

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Karen E. McDonald, Washington, DC, for appellant.

Paul C. Rauser, Washington, DC, for appellee. Robert P. Watkins, Washington, DC, was on the brief for appellee.

Before TERRY, KING and RUIZ, Associate Judges.

TERRY, Associate Judge:

In this medical malpractice case, appellant sought damages from Georgetown University Hospital (“the hospital”) for its failure to diagnose and treat her skin condition, which was identified — at various times and by various doctors — as eczema, vitiligo, lupus, idiopathic guttate hypomelanosis, and (the ultimate diagnosis) post-inflammatory hypopigmentation. A doctor employed by the hospital prescribed a steroid cream; six months later, another doctor at the hospital prescribed a different steroid cream. Appellant eventually went to another medical facility and there received different treatment.

After extended litigation over discovery, the hospital filed a motion for summary judgment; appellant filed an opposition two weeks later. The trial court, in a thorough and detailed twenty-page order, granted the hospital’s motion. Appellant noted this appeal; we affirm.

“The plaintiff in a medical malpractice case bears the burden of proof on three issues: the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff’s injury.” Meek v. Shepard, 484 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C. 1984) (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Allen v. Hill, 626 A.2d 875, 877 (D.C. 1993); Psychiatric Institute of Washington v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 623-624 (D.C. 1986). Each of these elements must usually be proved by expert testimony. See Cleary v. Group Health Ass’n, 691 A.2d 148, 153 (D.C. 1997); Allen v. Hill, 626 A.2d at 877; Psychiatric Institute, 509 A.2d at 623-624.

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The record reveals that in opposing the hospital’s motion for summary judgment, appellant presented no evidence whatever, either expert testimony or any other form of proof, to establish what the standard of care was or how it was allegedly breached by agents or employees of the hospital.[1] Appellant relies on a single sentence in an “affidavit” by Dr. Benjamin and a statement in her own Rule 26(b)(4) statement[2] — which was filed several months after it was originally due — purporting to summarize the expected testimony of Dr. Provost. But neither of these documents is sufficient to defeat the hospital’s motion for summary judgment, for neither meets the requirements of Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(e).[3] Each is, at best, a conclusory statement[4] unsupported by any specific facts. It is not enough for a witness (or prospective witness, as in this case) simply to say that the relevant standard of care was not met; the witness must state, in addition, what that standard was and how the defendant’s conduct fell short of it. No such showing was made here. See Ferguson v. District of Columbia, 629 A.2d 15, 19-20 (D.C. 1993). Nothing in any of appellant’s other proffered documents, even assuming they were properly considered in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, was sufficient to establish at least these two essential elements of her case.[5] See Allen v. Hill, 626 A.2d at 878. As the trial court stated in its order, “conclusory allegations are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact.”

We are in substantial agreement with the trial court’s analysis and find no error in its ruling. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The order granting summary judgment for the hospital is accordingly

Affirmed.[6]

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