DOBBS v. DUNCAN, 458 A.2d 719 (D.C. 1983)

Nos. 81-965, 81-1317, 81-1610 and 81-1611.District of Columbia Court of Appeals.Argued May 19, 1982.
Decided March 9, 1983.

Appeal from the Superior Court, District of Columbia, W. Bryon Sorrell and Truman A. Morrison, III, JJ.

Catherine R. Mack, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Stanley S. Harris, U.S. Atty., John A. Terry, Asst. U.S. Atty., at the time the brief was filed, and Oscar Altshuler, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., at the time the brief was filed, were on the brief, for appellant.

Elizabeth J. Branda, Public Defender Service, with whom William J. Mertens, Public Defender Service, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellees. Barbara Elkin, Public Defender Service, Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance for appellees.

Before NEBEKER, FERREN and BELSON, Associate Judges.

NEBEKER, Associate Judge:

In this consolidated appeal, the Superintendent of St. Elizabeths challenges the trial courts’ dismissals of four separate petitions for hospitalization filed by him pursuant to D.C. Code § 21-541(a) (1981),[1] and

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D.C. Code § 21-582(b) (1981)[2] — the hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act (the “Ervin Act”). He contests an interpretation of these statutory provisions as they impact on the petitioning process. The interpretation requires him, as a physician-petitioner, to have personally examined the individual within the previous 72 hours, even though one of his staff physicians has made the statutorily prescribed examination. We reverse.

I
Section 541(a) of the Code states who may petition for an involuntary commitment order. It provides that the petition be accompanied either by (1) the certificate of an examining physician or (2) a sworn statement by a petitioner that he has reason to believe that the person is mentally ill and a danger to himself and others, and that the person has refused to submit to an examination by a physician. A complementary code provision, § 582(b), provides, however, that “a petition, application, or certificate of a physician may not be considered unless it is based on personal observation and examination of the alleged mentally ill person not more than 72 hours prior to the making of the petition, application, or certificate.” Issue is joined over the actual effect of this language in § 582(b) upon the petitioning process emanating from the hospital through its superintendent as outlined in § 541(a).

Appellees contend that the intent of § 582(b) is to require that where a physician (unlike any other authorized petitioner) petitions the court for a hospitalization order, he, in addition to the certifying physician, must have examined the patient within the previous 72 hours. It is undisputed that in the four cases here on appeal, the superintendent, as petitioner, did not personally make such examination. In each case, his petition was accompanied by a certificate completed by a staff physician who had made the examination within the previous 72 hours.

The superintendent asserts that the trial courts’ interpretation of § 582(b) was error; that it was inconsistent with § 541(a) and the overall statutory scheme and purpose of the Ervin Act. We hold that the certificate of the staff physician complies with § 582(b) and that the superintendent may independently act as a physician-petitioner.

II
The nature of our review of the trial courts’ action in these cases is dictated by canons of statutory interpretation and construction and common sense. Most important in these cases, and in the context of a comprehensive statute, “we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.” Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713,

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95 S.Ct. 1893, 1898, 44 L.Ed.2d 525 (1975) (citations omitted) See also Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11, 82 S.Ct. 585, 592, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962); Don’t Tear It Down v. Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corp., 206 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 128, 642 F.2d 527, 533 (1980). We are aware that while it may be incongruous to construe a single provision of a statute so as to render another part meaningless, see In re T.L.J., 413 A.2d 154, 158 (D.C.App. 1980), discordant provisions of a statute should be reconciled whenever possible. Don’t Tear It Down, supra, 206 U.S.App.D.C. at 128, 642 F.2d at 533. However, we do not find discord in these two provisions.[3]

Section 541(a) authorizes six classes of persons[4] to petition for the judicial hospitalization of an individual. It also establishes the methods by which those petitions should be filed. Most importantly, it creates two separate procedures for the petitioning process. One authorizes non-physician petitioners, where the individual has refused examination, to petition for hospitalization by a sworn statement. The statement must detail “the facts and the reasons” for the belief that the individual is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others. See D.C. Code § 21-541(a)(2)(A) (1981). The other, the process used here, requires a petitioner to be a physician, or to secure a physician, able to state in a certificate that the individual is mentally ill and a danger to himself or others. See D.C. Code § 21-541(a)(1). In the instant cases, the superintendent petitioner may only proceed as a physician within the statutory framework. D.C. Code §§ 21-501, -541(a). However, by including the certificate of an examining staff physician he has complied fully with D.C. Code § 582(b).[5]
That the petitioner in these cases is a physician does not require more of him than would be required of a spouse who has included with her petition a certificate of an examining physician.[6]

We hold that § 582(b) does not require that a petition filed by the superintendent and accompanied by a certificate of an examining physician also reflect that the superintendent personally examined the patient. It is enough that the superintendent’s petition include separately the proper certificate of an examining physician. The statute commands no more.

Reversed and remanded.

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